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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE ST ...-\.TE OF lTTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plai·ntiff a·nd Respo'rtdent,

vs.

CASE

E. B. ERWIN, HARR\~ FINCH and
R. 0. PEARCE,
Defendants and

NO. 6200

~-!ppellants ..

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
This case has been analyzed in the previous briefs
filed. This brief will be devoted to calling attention to
some specific and basic points of difference which appear to us to be of conclusive importance on this appeal. The same order of discussion. will be ofbserved
as was followed in the main briefs after a brief discussion of the indictment and evidence.
THE INIDICTMENT

This indictment, it will be recalled, accused these
appellants and others, naming Ben Harmon, deceased,
and Mr. Thacker, acquitted, that they ''did wilfully and
unlawfully agree to cDmbine, conspire and confederate''
4
~ •
''On the 6th day of January, 1936, and on divers
other days and times between that day and the first
day of January, 1938, • * * to permit, allow, assist and
enable houses of ill fame * • * lotteries, dice games,
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slot machines, book malting, and other gambling devices
and other games of chance to !be kept, maintained and
opera ted. ''
While we do not waive any of the .contentions as
to the indictment made in our former briefs, we emphasize again that this is an attempt to allege an agreement. What were the terms of the agreement~
There is no point to arguing the validity of the
statute as to short forms of pleadings in ·criminal cases.
The cases cited in the Brief of Mr. Erwin are conclusive
that this cannot limit the constitutional provision of a
defendant to be informed, ''of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.''
(References hereafter to the Erwin Brief will be
marked "E", .and to the Finch and Pearce Brief will
be marked ''F and P'').
The point is that this indictment does not sufficiently allege the agreement to enable a defendant to he
informd as to the nature of the a.ccusation or so as to
protect him against other prosecution for the same
a:cts that might be involved under the generality of this
allegation.
P1articularly, it does not allage the "means agreed
upon", to "permit, allow, as.sist and. enable". Clearly
it eould he in the mind of the Grand Jury that the appellants agreed to solicit !business for these places, that
they agreed to advertise these places, or that they
agreed to provide financial assistance, or housing assistance for these places, or that they agreed to particiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

profit~

front them, or thnt they agreed to
afford polict~ proeetion for tht\~l~ pln<.'Ps, or thP operators thereof. The:::-e or any nuntber of other tnean8 of
assistance might have been in the nrind of the Grand
Jury, or might be later charged against tht.\st~ defPndants, as constituting the ··means agreed upon.''
pate in the

The case cited (E. bf. p. 15) where it \vas held
that an indictment "to injure, oppre:::-s, threaten, or intimidate'' citizens. w·as in~ufficient, is certainly in point
in principle on this matter.
While it is now conceded that the indictment could
not "be cured_ by the Bill of Particulars (Respondent:'s
brief, p. 45) this \vas not the position taken in the trial
court but an effort was made to allege the means agreed
upon or supply the same by the Bill of Particulars. The
Bill of Particulars, however, in no way supplied this deficiency in the indictment. It did inject into the case
another cause of action entirely, which has lbeen relied
npon as the charge here in the opening ·s tatem·en t, in
the evidence, in the instructions, and now finally in the
brief of respondents.
This allegation in the Bill of Particulars said ''That
during all of the period between the 15th day of March,
1936, and the First day of January, 1938, the said appellants permitted, allowed, assisted and enabled houses
of ill fame'', etc. ''"' "' * to he kept, maintained and operated * * by then and there failing and refusing to
make arrests. ''
1j:

'Thus the Bill of Particulars alleged a substantive
offense eommitted by the appellants and for which they
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were tried. The indictment, however, alleges no substantive offense but alleges an agrement which was the
corpus delicti of the offense.
(See E. lhf. p. 23 et seq.) on the proposition that
the District Attorney can not "assume to ·specify" the
offense the Grand Jury intends to charge.
·Coming back to the indictment the question is what
are the acts or what are the things that thes·e people
~agreed to do or perform. It is argued that the object
of the conspiracy was to penni t or allow as alleged.
Clearly this might be accompliS'hed by doing any number of things or by doing nothing.
Even in a ·civil ease if a person should attempt to
allege an agreement he couldn't allege it without stating what it was that the parties agreed to do or perform. Even 'vhere .a. substantive offense is alleged and
it is alleged that defendants agreed to confedenate to
commit it, it is required that they allege the acts that
they a.greed to do or perform.
The Topham ease, decided by our ·Supreme Court,
cited at page 19 of the Erwin Brief, is a leading case
on the general principle, sustained hy the following
ca.ses, some of which ,are ibased upon the Topham case.
As the indictments used somewhat similar language to
that used here, they will illustrate this defect.
In Abrams v. State 161, P 3.31, (Okla.) the defendant was ·charged that he unlawfully "procured" a girl
to become an inmate of a house of ill f,ame. Holding the
Complaint bad the Court said, and cited the Topham
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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caH~

in ~upport of it~ t)puuon, that thL\ n~L\ nf thP \Vord
··procured'' "~a~ not ~ufficieut. that t'hert' are numy
things that might haYt~ been done to ec.nnt\ under the
definition of this word and ~aid:
''It is then ne·ees~ary. in charging an offense
claimed to be embraced "ithin the general language of the statute. to set forth the particular
things or acts charged to haYe been done with
reasonable certainty and distinctness.''

People z-. Burns, :2±1 P. 935 (Cal.), is another case
which cites the Topham case. and where the defendant
was charged and convicted for inducing a· female, etc.,
to enter prostitution. in that the defendant qid unlawfully '·cause, induce, persuade and encourage" her. This
was the language of the statute. The Court held the indictment bad. It recites that each of these words had
a meaning and that effect, should lby the Court, be
given to the meaning of each and that the defendant
therefore could not knDw in advance what acts might be
proved. That it was necessary to allege what ''was the
means'' used by the defendant.
~

Cole v. State, 177 P. 129, was a case in which the
defendant was charged that he did knowingly ''harbor,
aid, assist", etc., a fugitiYe from justice. The court
said:

"How would the defendant be able to prepare his defense without :being informed by the
information how ·he enabled or how he assisted
or how he harbored, or how he concealed, said
~ugi tive from justice. ' '
This court cite-s 124· U. S. 483, 31 L. Ed. 516 upon
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the proposition that while an indictment may charge an
offense in the language of the statute that the descripion nevertheless "must be accompanied by a statement
of all the particulars es-sential * * * to acquaint the accused with what he must meet on trial."

People v. Z·ambounis, 167 N. E. 183, (N. Y.).
The defendant was eharged that he did unlawfully,
with intent to sell, show lewd, obscene, etc., printed matter. The court said while it was not necessary to allege, this, material in full, the defendant should be informed of the "nature of the eharge against him and of
the act .constituting it", not only to enaible him to prepare for trial, but to protect him from again being tried
for the same offense, and that no ·defendant should be
required to resort to the testimony in a:ny case to show
that he had already been tried for the same acts.
In Hood v. United States, 43 F (2) 353 (10 C. C.) it
wa:s charged that the defendant did ''receive, conceal,
buy and facilitate the transportation, ·concealment and
s:ale" of narcotic drugs. The court held that the charge
did not identify the offense within the rule of Skelley v.
United States, 37 F. ( 2) 503, and that the charge should
have been sufficiently definite to identify the acts committed and distinguish them from ·other similar offenses.
In People v. Ward, 42 P. 894 (Cal.) it was held that
although alleged in the language of the statute, that the
defendant did ''give a bribe'', the indictment was not
good because it did not eharge the defendant with "any
acts'' of giving· anything of value.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There are numerou8 eft8e8 holding that \Vh~re statutes are general in attempting to ~tate offensl)S and do
not specify the "'·a.l'"t$" "yhich are made criminal, not
only the indictment$ thereunder, lbut the ~ta tutes themselves, are bad.
...... )
u,u,
St at e v. B lt.rns, -·Y~u P. (- _·)) 731 (J;J

State v. Dia-mond, :!0:! P. H88 {.•Y.
. Jl.):
State v. Satterlee. 202 P. 636. (Kan ). ln this case
the court said: ''The statute prescribes punishment for
any one who carelessly or negligently handJes or exposes nitroglycerin''. but does not say what acts constitute carelessness or negligence, thus neces-sarily leaving
the jury to determine what is carelessness or negligence
in any particular case.'' The court then says that neither the statute nor the indictment drawn in the language
of the statute, ''inform the defendant of the nature and
cause of he accusation against him."
See also Ex parte Moo·re, 224 P. 662 (Ida.).
That this principle with relation to language such
as is used here and applied by the foregoing authorities
in cases alleging a substantive offense, also apply to allegations of the agreement is shown by numerous cases,
some of which are cited in the brief of Appellant Erwin.
It is not contended that the means must be alleged
independently of the statute in every instance, but the
rule is that they must lbe alleged unless the language of
the statute clearly indicates the "acts" constituting
''the means agreed upon''.
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United States v. Grwnberg, 131 F. 137 (C. C. A.) ~s
a case squarely illustrating what we point out here.
'There, the indictment which "ras held bad, alleged that
the defendants 11amed conspired and confederated, etc.,
by "agreeing to defraud the United States of America
of large sums of money to become due and payable to
the United States of America as customs duties accruing upon divers importations of merchandise to be
thereafter imported and brought by Grunberg, Baitler
and Burnham * * * from Switzerland into the United
States * * * into the port and ·collection district of Boston and Charlestown in s1aid district of Ma8'sachusetts. ''
The opinion of Justice Putnam says :
''Every element is here which is necessary
to make out to the common understanding on
offense. But, according to the ~settled pr,a,ctice
on indictments for conspiracy, whether the means
to be er1nployed are in themselves lawful or unlawful, it is not sufficient to merely allege in such
general terms that the defendants have conspired
to defraud. The indictment n1ust allege, to some
extent at least, the means intended to be used.
in defTauding. ''
''Of course, there are various ways of defrauding
the customs. Parties may conspire to defraud by
smuggling in goods at 'night; they may conspire
to defraud by bri'hing the custom house officers;
they may conspire to defraud by forging invoices;
they may conspire to defraud by false invoices;
and the pleader must ordinarily show, in a general way, which ·of those methods the parties trtended. The- indictment must go at least so far as
to point out something as to the \Yay in which
the parties intended to defraud because therP
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cannot be a conspiracy known to the grand jury,
without some kno"~lPdge of the general line in
which it "·as to tnarch. ''
Thus, is pointedly
indietmen t.

sho\\~n.

a glaring defect in this

Respondent. in answer to the foregoing and to the
other arguments of appellants with relation to the indictment, merely cites People vs. Tene·rswicz, 266 Mich..
276; 253 }.~. W. 296. This case was cited and distinguished in our original ibrief. (F. & P. p. 15 ). Respondent
passes over it very lightly, doubtless for the reason that
it is clearly distingnishalble.
That case charged that certain police officers, naming them, and certain named operators of houses of
prostitution conspired unlawfully "to permit and allow
the keeping, maintaining and operating of houses of
ill fame." The import of the indictment, the hill of particulars and the proof is that they entered into an agreement for the operation of the houses of prostitution,
of the defendant operators, and that such operation
was a felony under the laws of the State of Michigan.
The opinion is somewhat confusing and illigi:cal. Jt
cites the ·case of People vs. McKee, 146 Pac. 522, (See F.
& P., p. 16), which held that such an agreement with operators by officers constituted a conspiracy to "obstruct
justice.'' This opinion then loses track of this, and argues that this operation was a crime, and then cites a
number of cases to support it, and ends up by holding
that what was charged was a substantive offense, and
that these parties conspired to commit it. It was not unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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der a conspiracy statute, but was a common law conspiracy. The opinion points out that it was shown that
every defendant charged participated with the other
defendants in operating the houses of prostitution and
in dividing the profits among the group, eonsisting of
the officers and operators charged. This is an entirely
different situation and a situation where the conduct of
the parties acting together might tend itself to prove
the agreement, as in many other cases where a substantive offense is charged and the conspiracy consists merely in combining to commit it. This we have
pointed out repeatedJy in our lhrief is not our case.
The conten.tions made by us here were not made
In that ~case. The contention was made, not that the
agreement, but that the .substantive offense was. not sufficiently defined. The opinion devotes a good deal of
diseussion to the point that where a. conspiracy to commit an offense is charged, and is. so charged that the
conspiracy is made the gist of the offense, it is not
necessary to defin.e the substantive crime with the same
particularity as if the commission of the substantive offense was a direct charge. While this is a ·<1oubtful propposition itself, it is not involved here. We might add,
ho,vever, that in the later ea·se of People vs. Westerberg, 265 N. W. 489, the same court he1d that an indictment ·charging that the defendant did break in and enter the building of a person named in an attempt to commit a felony, was had for the reason that it did not define the acts which it was claimed would constitute the
felony. ·The opinion says:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"'Both in this ~tate and ('l~l\where it is thP
rule that. "-here a ~tatutP uses getH\ral or g"l\llPrie
terms in de~erihing an offense ~ • .-. or the ·statute
charges a mere legal conclusion, an inforn1a tion
which alleges the crime in the \\~ord~ of the ·~tat
ute is not sufficient.'·

IKSUFFICIEXT E\TlDENCE
The extended and as \Ve belieYe, sound a.rgument~s
and the numerous authorities eited in our main briefs
show that the evidence here is \\·holly insufficient. These
are met by the statement that it will help to arrange the
same evidence in chronological order and :by the citation of the lTtah case later considered. As was stated in
Wyatt v. r:. 8., 23 F (2) 791 (F. & P., 132, 172) alw.ays,
''Keeping in mind that the one crime which
the indictment charged against all defendants is
conspiracy * * * not the substantive crime of
violating the law itself... ·. ",
the chronological arrangement by respondent here
does not aid its case even though, it will be dbserved
that it contains over-statements of what was actually
testified.
Usually where the agreement is the gist of the offense and the parties charged are not accused of committing a substantive crime, so that their joint engagement in the crime may be some evidence of the agreemeat, there is some evidence of association, convers1ations, correspondence, ·communications or confederation
of some kind. Here there is none.· The trial eourt indicated that the fact that operations were carried on which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were always carried on, is no proof of any a.gree·ment.
Neither is the individual conduct or statements shown
by the chronological statement, legal proof of the
agreement here, or of the participation of any appellant therein.
It is. only necessary to exannne the respondent's
statement of the evidence, keeping in mind that the
thing to be proved is "the" agreement, to at once determine this. There must be a meeting of the minds of
alleged conspirators on the alleged means before there
~can be an agreement.
The state, by its independent ·charge in the Bill of
Particulars, and b!J its proof, attempted to center upon
some question of knowledge of isolated law violations.
This. is utterly immaterial. The cases go much further
and hold that even knowledge of the existence of conspiracy as alleged in the indictment, and even though
one is in position to stop it and has the duty to do
so, does not justify a eonvi·ction. (~See F. & P., p. 80, 81)
Any ·condition or cireumstance that does not point
directly to p-roof of the agree1nent must be eliminated
in considering the question of evidence to support the
conspiracy here. (F. & P., p. 21-24) In State v. Judd,
279 P. 935, this Court goes further and says :
''Evidence is not relevant or admissible unless it tends to establish the facts sought to be
proved.''
And the same rule is. announced in State v. Dean, 254 P.
142, by this Court, the opinion there said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Evidence to be rele,~ant or material, of
course, must haYe son1e probative ,·alue, and in
some degree must tend to proYe "·hat is claimed
for il''
There is no esca.pe from the authorities cited, (F. &
P., p. 20, 23) to the effect that eYidence to be considered
as sustaining the charge must, in this kind of case,
based entirely upon circumstantial eYidence, ''so distinctly indicate the guilt of the accused as to leave no
reasona'ble explanation of them which is consistent with
the prisoner's innocence." (F. & P. p. 2:2)
So we see ~o-ain that even the wild opening stat~·
ment of the prosecuting attorney at the trial, if"· ad~-:
mitted to be true, and now the statement of evidence
by respondent in its brief and in its argument, do not
sustain or tend to sustain the charge of the agreement
alleged, no matter how it is arranged. Nor is there any
escape from the rule quoted from 16 C. J. p. 652, that
while prima facie proof of the existence of a conspiracy
might be sufficient to let in proof of the separate statements of the different alleged conspirator~ at different
times the rule of law now applicable as to such is this:
''But in order to warrant the consideration
<>f such evidence by the jury, a higher degree of
proof is required and it is necessary that the existence of the conspiracy be established or shown
clearly, and indeed it has been held that such
evidence can be considered only where the con:spiracy is established beyond a reasonable
doubt." (F. & P., p. 103)
And, further,

thi~

Court has .said

.1n

a 'I1umber .of
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cases that this question as to whether the evidence is
sufficient to justify a verdiet is a question of law to be
·determined by the court. In Stale v. Karas, 136 P. 788,
this question was involved and, the holding of the Court
1s reflected in the syllabus as follows:
''While the jury are the judges of the facts * * ~
it is * * * for the Court, and not the jury to decide in every ·case whether the evidence will justify a verdict for the party adducing the evidence.''
Dis,cussing this same principle in Spring Cavnyon v.
Industrial Commission, 201 P. 173, at 176, this Court
aga1n says:
''Whether a:n1 inference may legitimately he deduced from a particular fact or from a state of
facts, or from cireumstances, is purely a question
of law; while the prdba:tive force or effect that
shall ihe given to the· inference, if, as a matter of
law it may legitimately be deduced from the given fact or state· of facts, or circumstances, is a
question of fact. Whether the inference in que.stion may be deduced as claimed is therefore a
question of law which we must determine as
such.''
Respondent makes the statement throughout
brief and ar.guments in re.ferenee to separate and
ferent statements or conduct at different times by
ferent allege·d ·conspirators that this is ''some
dence of guilt." Guilt of what?

its
difdifevi-

The S'tate is invoking the pernicious. doctrine that
a eonvietion may be sustained on suggestions and intimidations of misconduct of which appellants have not
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been cha.rged aJld of ". hich tht:\y ha Yt:\ had no opportunity, and ngaiust "~hieh, there \Ya~ uo duty to defend; and,
in a properly conducted C<l~t:\ they 'vould not be permitted to defend. This practice has 'been eondemned not
only by numerous cases cited. in our original briefs, but
by Courts generally. (F. & P., p. 79-90)
Further as was aptly stated by Judge Rudki.ns, 7 F
(2) 28:
··A conspiracy is not an ominous charge, under
which you can prove anything -and everything,
and convict of the sins of a lifetime." (F. & P.,
p. 135)
And in connection with the testimony of Austin
Smith and Hayes, and even the long hearsay statements
of Fisher Harris, and particularly the testimony of
Holt, we ask the Court to consider the statement by the
Supreme Court of the State of California:

"To admit such declarations and such hearsay
testimony in proof of the conspiracy • • "" ''
would "in charges of criminal conspiracy, render the innocent and helpless victims of .villainous schemes supported and moved by the prearranged and manufactured evidence of the promoters thereof." (F. & P., p. 94)

-on this phase of the case respondent cites

the opinion of Judge Straup as quoted in the Inlow case. This
language was not there used by Judge Straup as he did
not write the opinion in that case, hut it was quoted
there. The language was used by Judge Straup in State
v. Tidwell, 44 Utah 248, 139 P. 863. It was to the effect
that evid(lnce must be considered in its relation to other
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evidence. This, of ·course, is not denied. This was a larceny case involving the stealing of a cow and in which
the opinion re-cites: ''The record shows ample evidence
to support the verdict.'' 'This quoted statement was
made in connection with the testimony of a butcher, as
to the kind of beef that he had purchased from the defendant, indi·cating that it was such beef as was claimed
to have been stolen by him. It was an incident merely
in the ease not essential to the conviction, and immediately following the quotation give:n 'by respondent, Judge
Straup said :
''We think this evidence had a direct relation
between and connection with other facts shown,
and that it, together with such other evidence,
tended to .show that the beef sold and delivered
to the 'butcher was the beef of the stolen cow."
Certainly no one should object to this kind of evidence in this kind of ease. But we ask the Court, what
are the eonneeting facts eve~n as now recited by the respondent which, together with other evidence, proves,
or even tends to prove the agreement alleged here bet,veen the defendants, and particularly after the exclusion as to each .circumstance of "any hypothesis" consistant 'vith the non-existence of an agreeme·nt, or of the
non-participation in the making of the agreement alleged, if any agreement had been proved.
The foregoing considerations, when the authorities
heretofore cited. are considered, require reversal of this
case as we believe, independent of the later showing in
our briefs. These relate as to a vast number of circumst~nces \vhich were inadmissible because of lack of founSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dation, or other\vi~e. and becau8e of lack of eorroboration of admitted accompliee~. or for the othPr reasons
stated; and also other ·errors.
We shall now briefly point out that appellants'
contentions and authorities on these and other rna tters
stand unanswered.
1

SEPARATE MATTERS OF ·DEFENSE

I.
Under classification of evidence (1), (F. & P., p. 13,
56) we pointed out that the fact of operating of houses
of prostitution, or the fact of gambling in licensed card
rooms, or the fact that lotteries occasionally operated,
whe14 as shown in the evidence and as instructed by the
court, they had operated, not only at the times alleged
in the indictment but also at prior and later times, and
operated in spite of anything that could be done in any
metropolitan city, was no proof of the agreement alleged. This was perfectly obvious.
Respondent passes over this merely with the statement, "The facl that these places operated was not evidence of an agreement, but when we consider that that
evidence with the fact that collections were being made,
instructions were being given to open and close these
places, we immediately see that their operation does
aid us in determining that the agreement existed."
We would like the Court to think about that, as it is
the basic and fundamental contention of respondent
here and throughout its :brief. No collections were made.
by appellants.
Collections were made from houses of prostitution,
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only by the state's protected, corrupt and uncorroborated erook Holt, if he is to he believed, in confederation,
he said, with Rosenblum, who was never claimed to be
a conspirator. This was in 1936, and with Ben Harmon
in ·the latter half of 1937. The only other -collection testified to was by a stranger, Stubeck, from one or two
card rooms totally disassociated from any appellant and
between January and April of 1937 when H. K. Re-cord, another of respondent's witnesses, was head of
the anti-vice squad and not even Holt was in it.
How eould these possibly be circumstances which
under the rule of evidence that the circumstance must
point directly to proof of the agreement between the
alleged ·Conspirators, after ex-cluding every hypothesis
of the absence of such agreement or the absence· of connection of the appell•a.nts with the agreement, if one were
proved. Can this lb·e said to be .such proof of the agreement alleged~ Not ''an'' agreement, hut ''the'' agreement.
The next suggestion is that because instructions
were given to open a~nd -close these places, this is proof
of the agreement. Now Holt did testify that in January
of 1937 Mr. Finch, and he alone told him to close these
places, and he said he told them to ·Cllose and he guessed
they temporarily did. His own evidence is, however, that
they ·couldn't stop prostitution even if they placed a
man in every known place. He testified that Mr. Finch
afterwards said to allow them to run but not run too
openly. As shown hereinafter, this was not corroborated
and was denied :hy Mr. Finch.
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~The

other matt~r of elo~ing· wa~ that ht> ordered
Holt to ~ee Rosenblum and d~n1nnd that th~ law be observed in his card room, and later ordered him to close
up Rosenblum. This \\·as at the very time that Holt
testified that he \vas collecting and turning prostitutes
money over to Rosenblum in the la~t half of 1936. Thi~
is the evidence as to opening and closing. Ho\v does
this prove the '~agreement here alleged.'' In addition,
this is the conduct of one alleged conspirator whlch
could not properly be introduced into the case until
a foundation was laid by making independent proof
of the conspiracy, and cannot now be considered at
all until the eonspiracy is independently proved. .T.o
be proof of an overt act it must first 'be shown that the
conspiracy existed, that :Yr. Finch was a party to the
agreement, and it was done to effect the object thereof.
103-11-3, R. S. "C. But, and in any event it does not
wder- the rule of circumstantial evidence in any degree
tend to prove the conspiracy here alleged. A moment's
analysis of the actual charge will definitely convince of
this.

II.
Under classification (2), (F. & P. p. 13, 58, Resp.
p. 56) we made a rather exhaustive discussion and citation of authorities relating to the contention of respondent that long recitals of things by Fisher Harris
and other witnesses and involving rumors of what they
had heard, claimed to have been recited to different
defendants, were here erroneously admitted as hearsay;
and while they were admitted upon the theory that they
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involved an admission, were wrongfully admitted for
the different reasons discussed at the places above indicated. And partieularly, and we again emphasize this,
because in no instance did they relate to the offense
charged here or to guilt of making the agreement. NQt
once was the alleged agreement or confederation of
these defendants ever even intima ted in connection with
these alleged admissions. Now the respondent answers,
but cites no authority in ·contradiction of our authorities that the charge must be of the offense made and
the answer ·Or the conduct of the defendant must constitute :an admis.sion of the eharge alleged. This is studiously evaded and avoided.
Respondent says in relation to these that the state
claimed that they ''showed a consciousness. of guilt on
behalf of the defendants." Guilt of what? We ask the
Court to read this part of the State's argument with
this question in mind.
Reference is made to the testimony of Austin Smith
and Ellett within ~thirty days after Mr. Finch had
taken offi·ce in March, 1936, when he certainly could
have 'been conne·cted with no monthly collections on the
first of the month. Further, there is not a wtOrd. of evidence that anyone ·collected frorn anyone in the first
half of 1936 or until August of that year. Austin Smith
had been removed from the .office of secretary to the
Mayor. He obviously falsified when he said he went
to Mr. Finch '·s home and was met by Mrs. Finch at the
door when Mrs. Finch was sick in bed and died from
the sickness that then confined her, and makes the- confusing statements that Mr. Finch said. ''The pay- off is
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$2,000.00 and probably ...\.b~ Ro~enblum would colh.\ct it.''
This vtitness apparently t.ri~s to sho"~ that Mr. Fiuch
had kno"~le-dge of a preYious pay-off and then tries to
project it into the future by saying Rosenblu1n ''would''
collect. It \Yill be remembered that Holt 'by his o\\,1
testimony did not contact Ros~nblum until August of
1936, and it was shortly after that Mr. Finch ordered
his card room closed. for law Yiolations.
Now Mr. Ellett testified ''his friends'' had. told
him that Finch · •was receiving'' $2500.00 a month behind his back. We will not here discuss the admissiblity
of this kind of evidence as that has been argued and,
as stated, this was during the first thirty days that
Mr. Finch was in office and he stated that he did not
think any mention of that kind could be intended to apply to him.

It will be n<>ted in stating this evidence, and we plead
with the Court to examine the actual record of testi-

mony, that this and other testimony is not properly set
forth in respondent's discussion here, particularly the
conversations of :\Ir. Harris.
But, and this is the point, supposing :\Ir. Finch did
have knowledge of a pay-off, or supposing Mr. Pearce
di~ have knowledge of a pay-off in ~larch, 1936, or any
other time, and it is testified that at three or four different times at several month's intervals during the t\\yo
years of 1936 and 1937 someone did say to Mr. Finch
in substance that there were rumors of a pay-off, what
does it prove as to the con tract alleged here~ It is only
eVidence of the agreement that we are interested in.
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There is here no question of whether something was done
accidentally or without intent, or that if an agreement
\vere made that it was so made. If the agreement had
been proved whether Mr. Finch vvas indifferent to rumors, and we think the evidence shows he was not, added
nothing. Certainly it could not be admitted as proof of
soinething done to further the agreement until the agreement, and his connection with it, was proved. It does not
tend to prove any confederation or agreement with any
alleged conspirator. And the law is that indifference to
a known conspiracy does not constitute an offense.
In this part of the argument it is contended particularly that \V hen Mr. Harris either said to Mr. Fish or
wrote on a piece of paper and handed it to Mr. Fish at
the Alta Club, after the conspiracy is alleged to have
been ·closed, and in which it was stated or written that
~1r. Erwin vvas receiving $750.00 and Mr. Finch $500.00,
that Mr. Finch said he had not heard of this. Respondent says Mr. Finch did not deny it but Mr. Harris testified that he did. Anyway, respondent sums this up by
saying, "it showed the consciousness of guilt."
Now first, we say there is no evidence that this particular thing had ever been stated even as a rumor to ~Ir.
Finch previously, so that if he made this statement it
was apparently true, and secondly, we say again, Guilt of
what~

If he had said in so many 'vords, ''I am receiving
$500.00, ,., it vvould have no tendency to prove the agreelnent alleged here nor vvould it he conduct which could
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spondent eite~ authoritie~ eYery one of "yhieh ar~ beside

the point. becau~e in eYery in~tanee "·here an undenied
charge is introduced a~ an ad1nission it is a eharge of the
offense for "·hich the defendant is being tried, and in no
instance is there any such thing here. This mass of incompetent recitals offered as testimony as discussed in
our original brief were inadmissible for the reasons
given, and in no event do they tend to prove the agreement. Respondent says "·hen they "·ere told that there
were rumors of these ··illegal ':rice activities'' they should
have disclosed that they had heard of them at different
times from other sources (Resp. p. 66), that their conduct indicated an intention to evade as much as possible
the truth surrounding the pay-off in Salt Lake City, and
that this was proof of the agreement. We say that under the law cited in our main brief that if respondent
had proved a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt and
if defendant had said, ''I know of this conspiracy I
know it exists. I know that houses of prostitution are
operating as a result of this agreement. I am not doing
anything about it and I don't intend to,'' that this would
not make him a party to the conspiracy and there is no
law cited to the contrary. (See F. & P. p. 79-83.)
r

How can respondent then depend upon a lot of reeitals at different times by different people of rumors of
prostitution and gambling in card games and one OJ;" two
mstances of lotteries, never brought to the knowledge of
any appellant at the time, as either proof of the agreement alleged, or the connection of any appellant with it,
no matter how often it was stated, or whether he de-
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nied or admitted that he knew about it. This contention,
it appears to us, is too absurd for further comment.
III.
Under classification (3), (F. & P. p. 14, 74) we discussed, as stated by respondent, seventeen different
points of evidence which we contended were erroneously
introduced and further did not tend to prove the agreement, vvhich is the corpus delicti of the crime here alleged.
It includes intin1ations of -vvrongful acts or neglect or
statements claimed to indicate irregular conduct of separate individual defendants at separate places and at different times during the two years involved. It in no way
relates to the agreement alleged.
Respondent says we shouldn't take these instances
separately but together and in connection with other evidence. We do not care how they are taken or in what
order. The authorities cited in our main brief commencing at page 78 clearly sustain our position with reference
to them and this contention and this authority stands
unrefuted.
Respondent -ci~tes with some little, variations its testimony again and again. There are some misstatements of
the record which are n1ore or less important. On page
88 they ·contend that Holt's testimony was. that Mr. Fineh
told him to quit making collections. We say it comes
down to the same staten1ent that they previously made
with relation to the same evidence, that he told him to
close up son1e places. We cite this testilnony as showing
the caliber of this uncorroborated, corrupt 'vitness (See
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F. & P. p. 35-37). and ''"e again assert that it comes down
to just ''"hat "·e stated.
Respondent sums up this part of its brief ·at page
90 bv•. saYing
that the~e incidents tended to establish
.
'~the connection of th~ defendants 'vith the conspiracy"
alleged in the indictment. This contention must presuppose that the conspiracy had been proved. It is apparently conceded that this kind of testimony doesn't prove
the conspiracy.
'--

Now again 'Ye ask that the Court take each statement made by respondent from pages 84 to 93 under this
classification and try to find one that shows the connection of any defendant with any agreement as alleged in
this indictment. We think there is no such. In this connection we directly challenge the statement made by respondent on page 85 that even Holt or anybody else has
testified that ~Ir. Finch told Holt to see Rosenblum about
making collections. On this matter, and this is intimated
at other places in the brief, there is testimony of Mr.
Finch and ~Ir. Thacker and other officers that ~fr.
Finch did at times, when burglaries were frequent in Salt
Lake, tell different officers to see not only Abe Rosenblum but others who operated card rooms, as well as operators of different cafes and beer parlors, and try to
get assistance as to any ''hangers-on'' around these
places who might be committing these burglaries. He did
tell Mr. Holt to see Rosenblum about the operation of
his card room and to see that it was operated within the
law, and later, to see that it was closed.
But, if Mr. Finch had told Abe Rosenblum to see
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Holt and tell Holt to collect from houses of prostitution
and bring the money to Rosenblum and tell Rosenblum
to bring it to him, still that would not prove the agreement here alleged nor tend to prove it. There is not a
scintilla of legal evidence that Mr. Finch ever touched a
cent of corrupt money. This whole contention amounts
to the proposition that 1\fr. Finch's attitude or some other
person's attitude toward a strictly closed town is proof
of the agreement here.
Respondent must know that this is not true, and the
district attorney also knew that he could get a conviction
anyway by making a lot of intimations of miscellaneous
and colored wrong attitudes, and by getting them before
a jury of laymen by means of his own opening statements
and arguments and by various nondescript witnesses, and
by prepared statements of the city attorney worked out
for the purpose of ousting Mr. Erwin as mayor. The
district attorney was never interested in seeing that these
appellants had a fair trial. They have had to appeal to
this Court for protection of their rights in this respect.

IV.
Under classification IV (F. & P. 90) (Res. 93), we
discussed statements of certain persons made outside of
the presence of any person claimed to be a conspirator.
This relates to statements attributed to Mr. Erwin-"I
now have my chief of police''; the statement attributed to
Mr. Pearce that he was authorized by Mr. Erwin to make
some arrangement with H. K. Recovd when he was head
of the anti-vice squad; the statement made after the conspiracy was alleged to have closed and after the conduct
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complained of is ~tated by Fi~her Harris to haYe stoppt~d,
that Harmon told I-lolt that Fi~her Harris and l\l r. Lee
had arrust'\d Mr. Pearce of being: inYoh~ed in eollPetions;
and that staten1ent of l(empner that Stubeek had said to
him that Harmon 'Ya~ diYiding the n1oney collected "Tith
Ermn and his crn\vd.
In our main briefs. we supported our contention
that these statements were without sufficient foundation
and were prejudicially introduced and constituted
ground for reYersal, and do not tend to support the allegation of any agreement.
We cited authorities at length (F. & P. 92) from our
Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, showing that this
was a matter of agency and must be \Yithin the scope of
the agency, and after proof of agency. These authorities
are not disputed. R-espondent (p. 93) appears to admit
that this testimony did not tend to prove a conspiracy
but says ''these acts were done in furtherance of the conspiracy.'' ""\\~ e refer the Court particularly to the statement attributed to :Mr. Pearce and to Kempner and say
again-What conspiracy? Certainly :\fr. Pearce's alleged conversation "ri th H. K. Record has nothing to do
with the conspiracy alleged, and certainly Stubeck was
never connected with any conspiracy, or with any one
charged with being involved in this one.
Where a substa;ntive offense is alleged as was done
in the cases cited by respondent here, the acts done in
consummation of the substantive offense charged, as we
have often stated, may even be evidence of the agreement, and it is stated in such cases that 1such acts by
one in consummation of the off.ense charged, may,
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after the -conspiracy is, proved and the connection
of the acting conspirator therewith established, be introduced as acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Here
the offense was the agreement. This must be first proved
in order for anything of this character to have relevance
and if this was proved here, such statements \vould appear to have no materiality, because the principal offense
vvould be cornplete, if and when, the agreen1ent \Yas established. Without such proof, the admission of any of
these_ statements \Vas clearly prejudicial. In other words,
unles-s or until this agreement was proved, these matters
of individual statement of conduct \Vere inadn1issible and
if the agreement had lbeen proved they add nothing to
that proof, and in addition were erroneously and prejudi'Cially admitted. State v. Smith (Wash.), 174 P. 9, contains in the opinion a statement of thi.s last point:
''There is no more insidious and dangerous
testimony than that which attempts to convict a
defendant by producing evidence of crimes other
than the one for which he is on trial. *
* 'ro
establish guilty intent, unlawful motive, or criminal knowledge, it is permissible to show that the
act charged against the defendant was one in a
series of similar ones; but beyond this the state
cannot go, and for the purpose of seeuring a conviction show the p~erpetration of other similar
acts, even though committed in furtherance of a
general scheme, where there is no proof requirPd
to establish intent, motive, or knowledge, other
than proof of the act charged itself.
:j(:

Furthermore, and this is vitally important, although
it is clain1ed some of these statements \Yere in furtherance of the conspira·cy, an examination will show that
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such incidental ~tate1nent of ~neh per~nn~ witl1 n.\t'Prenel)
to other persons· state1nent~ \Yould not. and did not, in
any ""ay. further the objpet~ of the eon~piraey. It is idle
to contend other,Yise.
Furthermore, the alleged staten1ent of Harn1on as to
Pearce after the conspiracy \Yas alleged to haYP been
concluded was admitted directly in the teeth of the decision of this Court in State v. De ...4.ngele . . ·.. 269 P. 515
(F. & P. 106).
Xow respondent intimates that the statement by ~lr.
Erwin as to :llr. Finch as Chief of Police was admissible
as an admission against interests (Res. 94) against l\lr.
Erwin. Of course, this is not true. The law is that such
an admission must be against the financial interest of the
declarant at the time he makes it. "nat the respondent
apparently means is that it is a confession of Mr. Erwin.
But the agreement here cannot be proved by confessions
as pointed out (E. 32-33) in State v. Johnson, 95 Utah
572, 83 Pac. (2) 1010, and other authorities cited, so that
this cannot be taken as proof of the agreement even as
against Mr. Erwin. "nat was it a confession of~ Certainly not the offense charged.
There simply is no defense of the introduction of thiH
testimony and particularly the damaging testimony of
Kempner as to the statement of Stubeck.
Respondent nevertheless attempts to defend this and
cites two cases. (Res. 94.) The first is Delaney v. United
States, 263 U. 8. 586, 68 L. Ed. 462. The reference to this
subject in the opini.on in that case is very brief. The statement as quoted by respondent as made by one of the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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spirators ''He told me that I ·could .s·ell whiskey, that it is
aU right, that Mr. ·G. had talked with Mr. D·. (the prohibition director and a defendant herein) and that we could
go ahead and sell whiskey.'' The case inolved the charge
of the substantive offense of selling liquor in violation of
the Prohibition Act. The statement was made at the very
time that the person making the statement was selling
the liquor. This is indicated from the facts as stated
hy the Circuit Court of Appeals. It is definitely pointed
out that the conspiracy between the speaker and the other
conspirator mentioned had been independently established. · The statement was made in consu1nmating the
. very act which was the basis of the substantive charge.
We, of course, do not contend that such a statement upon
such foundation could not be admitted.
But here is Stubeck, stated to have made a statement
about division of money to Mr. Erwin, when the colle·ction
of money is not the charge, no alleged conspirator was
present, no relation whatsoever was shown between Stubeck and any alleged conspirator. He was himself an operator of a licensed card room. It is not uncommon for
people in the same industry to collect money as a defense fund, or a political fund, or for the purpose of procuring licenses or concessions, or for any other number of
purposes. This money according to Kempner, was taken
openly to Harmon and p:ass·ed. over the counter in the
presence of a number of employees and customers.
In any event, no consp·iracy was independently proved
or attempted to be proved in which Stubeck was connected with these appellants. It could just as well have
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been claimed that he ntade the statemt\nt n~niust any
member of the jury trying him, or any n1e1nb~r of the
court, and the foundation ''"ould haY~ been the sntne.
Certainly. this. the la'" does not permit.
The other case relied upon by re8pondent, I nternationallndemnity Conzpany l'. Lehman, .:28 F (2) 1, "·as a
civil case inYol Ying a conspiracy in connection '"i th the
sale of land. The statement alleged to have been made
as to appraisement was made during the Yery tran8action
and after the conspiracy had been independently established and the speaker and the person n1en tioned shown
to have been connected in the conspiracy together. This
was so clearly shown, as stated by the opinion, that the
opinion says if the admission of the statement \Yere error.
it was not prejudicial because the testimony outside of
it was sufficient to independently require conviction.
There are other cases where a substantive offense is
charged and where statements were admitted \vhen made
after the conspiracy had been established and \vhen they
were in furtherance of the conspiracy, in the sense that
they were made in consummation of the crime chargPd
as the substantiative offense. We have no argument
with these cases. But here a contention is made that one
person can convict another by making a statement about
him without any foundation of agency at all.
Respondent says that such declarations made '' during the progress and in the prosecution of, the joint undertaking" have been admitted. And that is true, always
assuming, however, that the conspiracy constituting the
joint UIIJdertaking 1s independently proved so as to establish the agency and that the statement is within the scope
of the agency.
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Respondent also quoted a general statement to the
effect that they rnay be introduced when they form part
of ~the res gestae. T·his, involves a general exception to
the hearsay rule, but the res gestae here is the making of
the agreement constituting the offense alleged, so it is
foolish to talk about res gestae. in ·connection with these
statements, and particularly .Stubeck's alleged statements. It is needless to cite decisions from this Court
holding tha~t this rule as to res gestae ap·plies only where
the statements are made under the influence of an accident or other similar matter and under the compulsion
of the act, so that it is the act of speaking. That is what
the words mean. In other words, that the speaker n1aking the hearsay statement has no opportunity to consider
or make up a statement made.
22 C. J. 461, Sec. 549

''Spontaneity-a. In General. In order for
a declaration to be admissible as a part of the res
gestae, it must be the spontaneous utterance of
the mind while under the influence of the transaction, the test being, it has been said, \Vhether the
declaration \vas the facts talking through the
party, or the party talking about the facts. The
guaranty for truth is found in such a correlation
between the statement and the fact of which it
forms part as strongly tends to negative the su~
gestion of £a:hrication or invention, and a suspision of afterthought will prevent the recPption of
the statement.
\

It is difficult for us to imagine a .circumstance under
\vhich there could be such spontaneity in connection with
the making of an agreement alleged as the offense here.
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ing been n1ade under sueh influ~net~. ·rhi~ tP~timony.
particularly a~ to Stnbeek. "·n~ ju~t n~ dnn1nging as thP
Court indicated "·hen he ~nid it "·ould probably rP~ult iu
a new trial if not oonnee.ted up, and it neYer "·as. And
certainly statements made after the eon~piraey endt\d
couldn't be in furtherance of it, nor "~ithin the seope of
agency.
Considering our revie'' and the re~pondent 's review
of these four classe~ of testimony "·hich includes it alL
and the practicable admission of respondent that the major portions of it do not tend to prove the conspiracy had
independently been established, "'"e emphasize again that
the evi'dence does not support the verdict here, and this
really is so conclu5i\e as to obviate the necessity for consideration of any other matter. This is not intended, however, to in any way wai\e any contentions that we have
made because we have selected to argue to this Cour;
only those errors which appear to us to be clear and
manifest.

THE TESTIMOl\""Y OF ACCOMPLICE HOLT
The matter of corroboration of this admitted accomplice is discussed (F. & P. p. 117 ; Res. 108). Again
we find ourselves to be on what we believe is s'Olid
legal ground. We quoted from State v. LMis, 2 Pac. (2)
243:
·"Thus under .the statute there must be evidence independent and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice to show the corpus delecti that an offense was committed, and to oonnect the defendant with it."
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Also:
''The accompli·ce may ·state any number of facts,
and thHSe facts may aU be ·COrroborated by the
evidence of the other wi tnes•ses; .still, * * * if
they do not point 1pertinently to the defendant as
the guilty p.art.y or as a participant, this would
not he such .corroboration as is required by the
Code.''
It will he notieed how often the state, in attemptIng to cite testimony to show any support of the allegation of an agreem·ent here, has ·cited the testimony
of H.olt and the -collections made hy him. This is done
to try to tie the •case here in with the Tenero'\vicz case
(F. & P. 15), a case so much relied upon by the re·spondent. But in that case, as has been. pointed out,
the officers and the operators of hous·es of prostitution
were ·collecting and dividing the money from the operations which they had a~greed to ·carry on. H·ere Holt
nowhere testified to any agreement or ·confederation or
understanding with the appell:ants or any of them as to
his collections of money. H·e says he did collect and
turn money over to Rosenblum in the latter half of 1936,
and ~did eollect and turn the money over to Harmon in
the latter part of 1937.
Far from implicating Mr. Finch he corro'berates
Mr. Finch, and testifies that in May or June of 1938
he s1topped his ·car when he saw Mr. Hoagland and Mr.
Finch sitting in an automobile at Mr. Hoagland's home
and got in their car and that the following was said:
'' Mr. Finch said : ' I don't see what ha.s been
done that would ·cause this talk about taking
money from the underworld and about the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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parlment being tied up 'Yith thP unth)r\\Torld.'
And I said: •I don't kno"· htn,· nnyone could
have anything on you. You don't need to \Y.Orrr.
that inYolves .vou in
. I don't know anYthin~·
.
this.' ''
'--

We have never been able to see that there is any
'

proof of an agreement here e,-en including Mr. Holt's
testimony. No one could contend that outside of it there
is anything to "shoW" the corpus delicti or to connect
any of the appellants mth it.,' c~rta.inly no corroboration of a single thing Holt testified too.
U:ruWnbtedly this fell{)\\ used this m-oney, or at
least substantial amounts of it in his own operations
as shown bv his own te~timonv. In anv- event he was
a confessed criminal seeking to sa,~e his o'Dl hide and
his testimony should be regarded "-ith suspicion and
should not be given full credence.
-

-

w

- The argument of the state amounts to no more than
this :1-'hat this court should give full credence to the
testimony of this witness even though they admit that he
is an aooomplice. We say that the proposition is similar
to that in People v. Rodriquez, 99 P. (2) 363 (this page
was erroneously given before as 263) where the ap~
pelate court refused to give full credence to the testimony of an alleged .accomplice and where the court
says:

''·Thus it appears that a treacher-ous inf1uenoo
threatened Carroll's veracity.''
And in the case -of People v. Walther, 81 P. (2) 452, at
455, where the appellat court said :
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''We may assume that the di1strict attorney has
a right to arbitrarily seleet one of two coconspirators to whom he may tender immunity from
pr.01secution in reward for his state's evidence aga.ins1t his colleague, but such evidence is
open to 1suspicion lest the temptation to thus excape a threatened p·enalty of law may result in
irreliahle testimony. * * *
It is funda.mental that the fact of the existence of a -conspiracy to commit a crime must
first :be established before the declarations of a
coconspirator with relation thereto lbe,come competent or admissible. * * *
If the app~ellant is guilty of the last-mentioned offense his coconspirator is equally culpable, and under such .circumstances the court
should carefully s1cru tinize hits evidence to see
that the w.holesome rule with resp~ect to proving the f1a!cts ~constituting a -conspiracy independently of the coconspirator's admissions ha's been
eomplied with.''
We beg of the ~court to examine the testimony indep·endently of Holt, and assert that there will be found
no evidence to support the charge of an agreement here.
We · assert with confidence also that such examination
will disclo8e no eorroboration whatsoever of Mr. Holt's
testimony in any materi1al m~atter.

We dis·cus:sed (F. & P. 128) this question on what
we considered and still consider to be solid legal ground,
so solid in fact that there is no doubt in our minds as
to the soundness of our position. We ·contended that mere
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proof of other or 8Ulnller eon~piraei~~ cnuld uot he considered as sustaining- the main con8pi racy here alleged.
and also dicussed the prineipal ~rror of the court in
refusing to instruct at all upon thi8 subject l\\'"en though
did not contPihl that the proof
requested to do so.
of an agTeement bet\Yeen R.osenblum and Holt n1ight
not be introduced if it "~as also proof of the n1ain agreement here, but we did contend that clearly, in Yit.}\\T of
the way this case was tried, that this evidence of this
smaller agreement and others that "~ere suggested
would confuse the jury into conYicting here without
having actual proof of the main conspiracy particularly
if they were not instructed on this issue. We ask the
Court to consider this subject at the pages indicated
and the authorities cited in support thereof. (F. & P.
128 to 139).

' Te

Now respondent (Res. 115)

contends

that

the

admission of evidence of different and smaller conspiracies was not error. This is not supported, and
even so would not meet our contention. Respondent
citesBerger v. United States 295 U. S. 78, 79 L. Ed. 1314
and says that this case overrules the authorities cited
by us. This might be important if true. A careful examination of the opinion and of our briefs indicates that
no authorities cited by us was even mentioned, let alone
~verrnled in this decision. In this case the indictment
charged conspiracy to utter false nQtes of a federal reserve bank. T'he obj·ect of the utterance thus concerted
was not stated in the indictment, but the proof showed
an agreement between Katz, Jones and B,erger to ut1
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ter the fa1se notes and then ''to pass. the notes to
tradesmen''. Incidentally the evidence dis-closed also
an understanding 'between Katz and Rice, with reference to passing some of these notes ''to buy rings.''
With this Burger was not conne-cted. The eourt held
that the oolllspira:cy with which he was. connected and
convicted was alleged and also proved, that is the utterance of the notes, and although evidence showed that he
was not connected with the disposition of them in one direction, that this did not eonsti~tute a variance, even if as
·contended "in addition to proof of the ~conspiracy with
whi-ch petitioner was -connected, proof of a conspiracy
with which he was not connected was also furnished and
made the basi1s of a vei~di·ct against others.'' The Court
then points out that he is not in a .position to .complain
even if the other1s were in a position where they might
have appealed. The ·Court then illuS'trates by pointing
o'ut that if thes·e two incidents ·of the ·oonspir.a~cy had
been charged in different counts and Berger had been
convicted on the one but not on the other ·count, he
w·ou1d not be in a position to complain because others
had been eonviete~d on the other count. They therefore
held that Berger vvas not affected or prejudiced 'by
the other n1:atter heeause not involved in it and not convicted if it. rrhat is in no way eonfliet with any of
the authorities cited by UJS or with the sound principals
la:id down in those authorities
1

We urge particularly that the failure of the Court
to instruct on this subject at all was prejudicial, and the
~tate can not question that.
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RES

~Tl~DIC.A.'r ...-\. ...-\.~

Tl) JIR.. PEARCE
. .-\.Xl) Jl H. ER.,V"IN

This matter i~ dioou~~t.l(l (F. & P. 1:~9; Res. 1~0)
and we rely upon the authoritie~ there cited. \V e do
not belie\e that the respondent'~ brief oontrovt_)rts those
authorities nor that any further legal discu~sion would
help the Court. " ... e do point out that hl~re is an instance
where :llr. Pearce, for example. has been tried once on
the \ery same eYidence from the Yery same ""itnesses,
and only this. He is tried no'' again. What the jury
convicted him of under the circumstances it is impossible to say.
What we do say is that unless we can get applied
the settlecl principles of law as to pleadings, evidence.
and trials in conspiracy charges, any defendant, can
be tried a dozen times on the same evidence from the
same witnesses. It emphasizes the importance of our
contentions as to the indictment here not alleging the
means agreed upon, and again in oonnootion with the
last topic, the importance of the Court instructing the
jury that they must try defendants upon the charge
alleged alone, not upon other and smaller agreements
between other ·and different individuals at different
times, or upon other intimated matters of misconduct.
Certainly a defendant in this state inust still have the
constitutional rights to :be tried under such an indictment, and such proceedure, as ''Till protect him against
repeated trials for the same alleged conduct, and given a fair trial, and under instructions that will give
him the constitutional protection to which he is entitled.
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C~ONDUCT

OF THE DISTR:UCT AT'T·ORNEY

This subject is discussed ( F & P 154; Res. 134). We
do not intend to discuss it again at any length. \Ye
insist, however, that the showing made is sufficient to
require reversal of this cause even if no other ground
existed. We would like to cite respondent's o\vn case,
Berger v. United States, 295 U. 8. 78, 79 1-'. Ed. 1314,
re,cently diS:cussed under a previous top~ic as showing
a parallel situation. In this case notwithstanding that
the court held there was no error in the matter w·hich
respondent and we previously di,s~cussed, it reversed the
case because. of the conduct of the district attorney,
which was not so seriously prejudicial as in the case at
bar.
In the brief and in the argument here, atte1npt i~
made to show that the district attorney 'vas opposed by
such outstanding counsel and so harassed by us that his
conduct should be excused. Unfortunately it was not us
but the appellants who were made to suffer. A reading
of the record, moreover, will show that he \vas not so
harassed. In fact it will be very difficult for this Court
to find any objections made by counsel for the rlefense
that did not have real merit. There vvas no disposition
on our side to over-ride the rules. We \van ted the rulP~
observed. With very few, if any exceptions, the re1nark~
that were made by us were made to the Court \vithout
design to influence the jury, and were pertinent to tlw
matters being discussed.
The respondent further contends and ·cites son1e
authorities. in support of the contention that the mere
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fact that the pro~~enting attorn~y ~hltP~ Iuattt.'r~ whil'h
may not be able to proYt:.'. i~ not gnntnd for n\YPr~al
if the staten1ent i~ n1ad~ in good t'aith. 'Yith thi~ \\'P
agree, but \Ye ~ay that any on~ "·ould haYP tu ~tultify
himself, in reYie,Ying the eonduct of tlu:~ di~triet attoriH\)
here and reading his opening: statement and the other
matters referred to in our brief ( F & P 1;)-!-l ();)) tu prPtend to believe that the di~triet attorn~y wa~ aeting
conscientiously and with a good faith r~gard for the
rights of appellants here. and "ith the purpose of giYing·
them a fair trial.

he

We point out that the conduct of the district attorney
in the examination of lrr. Finch and reading fron1 a
newspaper the rumors as therein recited to the jury a~
to alleged conditions of nee in Salt Lake City. i~ not
only sufficient to establish, by itself alone, the absence
of good faith on the part of the prosecuting attorney.
but also to justify a reversal of this cause. It \vas exactly
the kind of conduct for \Yhich the Berger case, surJra,
was reversed by the Supreme Court of the Unite:l State~.
(Abs. 200, F & P 169.)

IMPROPER E\-.-IDEXCE

.A.D~IITTED

The matter of improper evidence is discussed
throughout our former brief (F & P 166) and under all
the four classifications of evidence contained therein.
It would serve no purpose to attempt to revie,,v this
discussion or the authorities. We also make reference
to the assignments with relation to this. (F & P 16G)
Respondent, under this heading, makes a brief discn~si( )n
of this matter in answer to our statements. (F & P 166)
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This appears to add nothing calling for any additional
comrnent.
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
rrhe confusion, comrnencing with the Bill of Particulars charging a different offense, and continuing
with insinuations of irrelevant misconduct and evidence
not pointing to the actual agreement as charged; also
the confusion of this case with cases where substantive
offenses were charged, has continued throughout the
trial, and was then carried to the jury through the·
refusal of the Court to give requests for instructions
and also in the instructions given. (F & P 171; Res. 14!:>)
Respondent cornmences by discussing our requests
for instructions as to alleged admissions by silence,
and says that they contend that Mr. Pearce's conduct
when interviewed by Fisher Harris was an ad1nission.
It will be recalled that lvfr. Harris testified over and
over that he started out asking Ivt:r. Pearce for infornlation, reciting that Harris had made an investigation and
found that there was vice in existence and that then'
was official connection therewith, and asked ~.ir. Pearce
to give him information. He clain1s that l\Ir. Pearce
hesitated- this was perfectly natural when infonnntion
was being asked for after a long recital -and that ][ r.
Pearce later denied any knowledge of it. He did 1nention
that Mr .P·earee was eonneeted with Harmon whom he
involved
Again we asked admission of 'vhat~ Nothing was
said about any connection by 1\Ir. Pearce 'vith any of
the appellants tried. Certa.inl~! ther~ 'vas no nchnission
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of the charge here because thert~ wn8 no 8tatt.\nl~Ht of
it. He stated he "·as llar1non ·8 attornt\Y· That i~ Bl)t
an admission of guilt of the offense for which he was
tried.
'Ve wanted an instruction that the long rt•eital~ to
defendants of rumors, etc. as testified, "~ere not to be
taken as evidence of the truth of tl1e n1atters r~eitPd.
It is just foolish to contend that \Ve \Yere not entitleJ
to an instruction on this matter. and \Ve neYPr got one.
Contention is made that some staten1ents in our rt:\quest
do not state the la"-· There is no authority to ~upport
this. The requests were taken from cases cited. In any
event, we were entitled to an instruction of snn1e kind
on this subject.

The next matter discussed is a request for an instruction on the subject of separate conspiracies or
separate offenses by different persons. ,,~ e were certainly entitled to an instruction that appellants 'vere not to
be convicted here because of the belief of the jury that
there had been some misconduct other than the conspiracy alleged. We have already mentioned this subject
and cited numerous and most convincing authoritie~
thereon. It was definitely an issue made by objection
to evidence and throughout the trial, and now the state
contends, contrary to all of the decisions of this Court,
that we were not entitled to an instruction at all on this
issue. They cite again Berger v. U. S. which has not the
slightest bearing on this subject. This was an Issue.
Then the refusal to instruct thereon was error. That
follows inevitably.
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The next matters referred to by respondent is \Yith
relation to instruction 12-a ( F & P 177; Res. 153). That
instruction clearly permitted conviction if the jury
thought that anybody had committed any act that might
have been committed if an agreement, such as was alleged, existed. The court itself indicated that he should
and probably would put into the instruction that a person commiting any such act would have to do it kno\vingly. He didn't do so. We contended that the jury
should be instructed that in any event, the act n1ust
be performed by one knowing of the existence of the
conspiracy. That the conspiracy must first be proved
and the knowing participation therein established in
order to convict, is too clear for further discussion. No
person's liberty would be safe if this were not the law.
No authority is cited to the contrary.
Respondent a number of times suggests that other
instructions tend to correct the error con1.plained of.
We do not find this to be so and this Court and other
courts passing upon this question have consistent}!·
held that where an instruction of this kind is given purporting to state the law to· the jury, that the appellat
court will not assume that the jury did not follo·w this
instruction, but might have followed so1ne other instruction containing different intirnations.
We pointed out in connection with instruction 13
(F & P 179; Res. 153) particularly, that while the Court
recites different alleged misconduct on state1nents by
different individuals at different times, there was ne·ver
any instruction that these could not be used h y the jury
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as proof of the agr~~n1ent or to t~ll the jury thnt it had
to be independently prov~d. Thi~ 1nattt)r i~ pa~~t\d oYPr.
In this connection. and at page 1;)-L re~pondent
refers to our request at page 2~~. "·ith relation tu tht·
alleged conversation bet"·~en Pearc~ and H. I'-.. l~eeord.
they say that this instruction doe~ not cl~arly s ta tP the
law and thev refer to the staten1ent of ~lr. Peart•tl
'
..
in that conversation with relation to haYing authority
from Mr. Erwin. This conversation "~as "~hen H. I(.
Record was head of the anti-nee squad, "·hen nnbo{ly
alleged to be conspirators had anything to do "·i th collections and when there is not a word of eYidence that
any collections were being made. Certainly the case
relied upon by respondent and cited by us ( F & P 17)
shows that this testimony "~as not admissible at all.
It is strange that respondent would contend that, eYen
taking this as broadly as they say, that ")Ir. Pearce
was trying to find a collector". at that time that thi~
was an admission of having entered into "the" agre(·ment alleged in this indictment. Certainly it was inadmissible against 11r. Erwin. Any instruction on this
was refused.

Respondent enters into a lengthy defense again of the
Court's instructions to the effect that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient if the jury believes that any inference of guilt may be drawn therefrom. This is plainly
contrary to the rule of law as to circumstantial evidence
in this case as cited in the numerous cases under Controlling Principles of Law (F & P 19-25). There cases
are cited from this and other leading jurisdictions lead-
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ing inevitable to the rule as laid down in Terry v. United
States, 7 F (2) 28, wherein the Circuit Court reversed
the trial Court for instructing the jury, exactly as it was
here instructed, that circumstance.s shown in the evidence and which ''give rise to a reasonable and just inference that they were done as the result of a previous
agree1uent'' justified a conviction. The Court said:
"This is not a correct statement of the law,"
and added:
''The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution must so distinctly indicate the guilt of
the accused as to leave no reasonable explanation
of them which is consistent with the prisoner's
innocence.''
1\espondent must ignore this principle of law otherwise a reversal of this case follows definitely because
of lack of evidence and because of the instructions and
refusals of requests for instructions. But this rule of
la'v cannot be ignored. It is too definitely established,
and to ignore it would be to disregard an essential legal
safe-guard which must result, and which has here resulted in the conviction of men entirely innocent of the
charge alleged.
This instruction 16 just flatly instructs contrary to
the law (F & P 180) and there should be no contentions
that it was not erroneous. This instruction even goes on
to say that the defendants can be convicted if the jury
f\nds they conspired and agreed ''among themselves * • •
or with Abe Stubeck". There was never a more amazing
injustice clone to any appellants than to instruct this
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jury that on this reeord tht'Y had nuy right or any foun-

dation or any eYidenee to tind any ngrt.'l'lltt.)nt with .\ hl~
Stubeck by any appellant here any n1orP than t hnt thPy
had an agree1uent 'vith .A.l Capone or "·ith thP Dukt' ot'
Windsor. 'Ye pointed out al~o that the Court hnd instructed (F & P 182) that Stubeek te~tified that he l'ullected money. This alone requires rever~al a~ a~~luning
something exactly contrary to the eYidence, and this is
particularly true in vie"~ of the fact that the Court
instructed that the appellants could be eonYicted n pon
the alleged conduct of Stubeck. Respondent has ei ted
no authority to the contrary. (See F & P 182. See also
I P 64-68.)

SUFFICIEXCY OF THE

E,~IDEXCE

This is a separate subdivision (Res. 158). It again
ignores the rule of evidence as to circumstances in conspiracy cases. They object that we elin1inate certain
evidence. " ...e do not do this. The rules of la"· and eYidence eliminate the great mass of alleged separate statements and other matters of that kind as proof of the
conspiracy. These matters depend upon agency and the
conspiracy must first be independently established in
order to establish the agency. Respondent cites a nurnher
of cases again where a substantive crime i~ charged
and the conspiracy simply consists in joining to e(>Jnrnit
the crime where the corpus delicti is the crime. They
again ignore in this case the fundamental distinction~
made in the authorities cited by us between that kind of a
case and a case where the crime and the corpus delicti
consist of the agreement.
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We now respectfully ask the Court to review the
points in conclusion as set out in our main brief ( F & P
185). We feel that this summarizes the errors and we
would not be justified in repeating this summary here.
In addition to this there is the point as to the sufficiency
of the indictment and the other points discussed in the
Erwin brief. (E. p 73).
CONCLUSION
It would seem that common frankness should compel the state to admit that this is a very unsatisfactory
case. No legal mind, we think, can take the pleadings
and their evidence and their brief here, and applying
recognized legal principles thereto, get any satisfactory
basis to support a conviction. It should be admitted that
in this hodge-podge of confusion there is no assurance
that any conviction here rests upon a clear understanding
by the jury of the actual charge and of the proper application of the evidence thereto. These are the very foundation of a fair trial. It certainly appears to us that
everything that is claimed here against any appellant
could have been done, if it was done, without even the
existence of any agreement as alleged. That, really is the
test a~ to circurnstantial evidence.
\Ve are dealing now with a question of law, as
pointed out in the second division of this brief. Whether
under the application of the rule as to circumstantial
evidence in this kind of a case, this evidence supports
the verdict. This is a question of law. It is also a question of law as to whether legitimate inferences of guilt
of the offense charged may be deduced from particular
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facts (201 P. 173, supra). Ct:\rtninly UP Court. and no
legal Dlind, can detern1ine thn t guilt 0 f t ht\ offt:\ll~P
charged n1ay ''legitin1ately be dt~duef'd · · fro1u ~epnratP
circmnstances depended upon by the ~tatP tP eon,·i(·t
appellants here. 'Ye do not mean thnt some inference
may not be dra,,ll of a "·rt)ng attitude or nf a ean\le~~
ness or of neglect "-e Inean legitiinate inferenet:\~ of guilt
of the charge here alleged. If "-e do not li1nit the inferences that may be legitimately dra"~ to the offense
charged, then ''e may as well thro'v a"-ay all la\\· book~
and all legal procedure.
We respectfully submit that this case should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

H. L.
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~-ittorney
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